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Abstract
This paper reviews fundamental concepts in environmental economics and explores theo-
retical results regarding the choice of the key policy instruments for the control of externalities:
taxes, subsidies and marketable permits. The paper explains why today market mechanisms
are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating unpriced rights and scarce resources. We
survey how significant market imperfections, a pre-existing regulatory environment and con-
centration in both permit and output markets can impede the proper functioning of a per-
mit system. The main factors that affect the effectiveness of marketable permits are then
discussed. Given the importance of understanding the emission permit price formation, we
overview recent attempts at developing valid price models for emission permits, taking into ac-
count banking and borrowing opportunities, pollution abatement measures, strategic trading
interactions and the presence of asymmetric information in the permit market.
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1 Introduction
Global warming is at the top of many agendas, particularly nowadays where virtually every
aspect of economic activity results in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), whose concentration
promotes global warming. In the last decade several organizations and policy regulators have
been studying and discussing with (environmental) economists possible strategies to tackle this
problem. Economists had what they saw as a coherent and compelling view of the nature of
pollution, with a straightforward set of policy implications. In fact, the problem of externalities1
and the associated market failure had long been a part of the microeconomic theory. Economists
saw pollution as the consequence of an absence of prices for certain scarce environmental resources
such as clean air and water, and they prescribed the introduction of surrogate prices in the form of
unit taxes or “eﬄuent fees” to provide the needed signal to economize on the use of these resources.
This explains why the source of the basic economic principles of environmental policy is to be
found in the theory of externalities. The literature on this subject is enormous: it encompasses
hundreds of books and papers. An attempt to provide a comprehensive and detailed description
of the literature on externalities theory reaches beyond the scope of this survey. Instead, we
shall try in this paper to outline the central results from this literature, with an emphasis on
their implication for a quantitative analysis of the price formation of the most popular policy
measure today: marketable permits. The aim of the paper is to provide a basic knowledge about
the theoretical results behind marketable permits as policy instruments and to facilitate the
development of more sophisticated quantitative models which try to describe those markets for
permits existing today.
We begin in section ?? with a review of the theory of environmental regulations and we explore
theoretical results regarding the choice of key policy instruments for the control of externalities:
taxes, subsidies and marketable permits. Section ?? overviews those factors, addressed by several
authors in the last two decades, that affect the effectiveness of marketable permits. Section ??
analyzes the recent attempts to develop valid static and dynamic price models for marketable
permits employed in air-pollution controls. Section ?? concludes.
2 Main Concepts in Environmental Economics
Taxes, subsidies and marketable permits In a competitive market, firms with free access to
environmental resources will continue to engage in polluting activities until the marginal return of
their production is zero. We thus obtain the familiar result that, because of their disregard for the
external costs that they impose on others, polluting agents will engage in socially excessive levels
of polluting activities. The policy implication of this result is then clear in economics. Polluting
1Externalities refers to situations where production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or
benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services being provided.
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agents need to be confronted with a price equal to the marginal external cost of their polluting
activities to induce them to internalize at the margin the full social costs of their pursuits. Such
a price incentive can take the form of the familiar “Pigouvian tax” - named after ?. This is a
levy on the polluting agent equal to the marginal social damage. Figure ?? illustrates how a
Pigovian tax works. The imposition of a unit tax on pollution emissions produces an upward
shift of the marginal cost curve by the amount of the tax, i.e. from MCI to MCII . Faced with this
cost increase, each company has an incentive to reduce output from qn to qt, i.e. to the socially
optimal level.
Figure 1: The Pigovian tax as a price system. MSC stands for marginal social cost, MC for marginal cost
and MR for marginal return.
Besides a tax on polluting activities, two alternative policy instruments have received extensive
attention in the literature: subsidies and marketable permits. Early on it was recognized that a
subsidy per unit of emission reduction could establish the same incentive for abatement activity
as a tax of the same magnitude per unit of pollution emitted. Soon it became apparent that
there are important asymmetries between these two policy instruments - see ? for a compre-
hensive analysis. In particular, these two policy instruments have quite different implications
for production profitability in a polluting industry: subsidies increase profits, while taxes de-
crease them. It may be helpful to explain this argument with an illustration. In figure ?? we
depict the equilibrium positions of a representative company and its corresponding industry in
three different situations: no environmental regulations; unit tax on pollution emissions; and
unit subsidy for emission reductions. Starting from the equilibrium point (qn, pn) where there
are no-environmental regulations, we observe that a unit tax produces an upward shift in the
company’s marginal and average cost curves to MCt,s and ACt respectively. If, instead of having
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no-environmental regulations, we consider a program of subsidies, the company’s marginal cost
shifts up to MCt,s, but its average cost is now reduced to ACs - see ?.
Figure 2: Tax and subsidy. MC and AC stand for marginal cost and average cost curves, respectively. D
is the aggregated demand curve of the output product, and S is the industrial supply curve.
We notice then that tax and subsidy programs have identical effects on a company’s marginal
costs. However, considering the pollution emissions of a whole industry, we note that the Pigou-
vian tax must result in a leftward shift of the industrial supply curve, from Sn to St, because
tax raises company’s marginal and average costs. Further, output price rises from pn to pt and
industry output falls from qn to qt with a consequent decline in the industry’s pollution emissions.
Conversely, the subsidy induces the entry of new companies producing the rightward shift of the
industry supply curve from Sn to Ss. This result in a price fall to ps and an increase in the in-
dustry’s output to qs and consequently in its pollution emissions. These two policy instruments,
therefore, have quite different implications for firms’ long-run, entry-exit decisions. This implies
that there is a further condition, an entry-exit condition, that long-run equilibrium must satisfy
in order to achieve an efficient outcome when designing a subsidy program. To obtain the correct
number of firms in the long run, it is essential that the firms pay not only the cost of the marginal
damages of their emissions, but also the total cost arising from them. Only if firms bear the total
cost of their emissions, will the prospective profitability of the enterprise reflect the true social net
benefit of entry and exit into the industry. However, a detailed discussion about tax and subsidy
programs is beyond the scope of this paper, and we refer interested readers to the literature we
cite in the body of the text.
The Pigouvian solution to the problem of externalities has been the subject of repeated attack
along Coasian lines. ? has elaborated on the externalities question by emphasizing that the root
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of the problem is that of undefined property rights. He claims that if the ownership rights to clean
air, for instance, were clearly defined and enforced, then self-interested parties would use legal and
market mechanisms to bring about a socially acceptable level of externalities. However, such a
theory holds only in the absence of transaction costs and strategic behaviour (more on this in the
next section). Following Coase’s principle, environmental economists introduced market-based
instruments so-called marketable permits. Suggested applications for the use of market approach
abound in the economics literature, especially in the fields of air and water pollution - see ?. In a
world of perfect knowledge, marketable emission permits are a fully equivalent alternative to unit
taxes. The environmental authority can set a price (i.e. a tax) and then adjust it until emissions
are sufficiently reduced to achieve a prescribed environmental standard. Alternatively, it can
issue the requisite number of permits directly and allow the bidding of polluters to determine
the market-clearing price. The regulator can, in short, set either “price” (tax) or “quantity”
(emission cap) and achieve the desired result. However, the basic equivalence obscures some
crucial practical differences between the two approaches in a policy setting; they are by no means
equivalent policy instruments from the prospective of a regulatory agency. A major advantage
of the marketable permit approach is that it gives the environmental authority direct control
over the quantity of emissions. Under the tax approach, the regulator must set a tax, and if, for
example, the tax turns out to be too low, the pollution will exceed permissible levels. In sum, the
regulatory agency might have to enact periodic (and unpopular) increases in taxes. In contrast, a
system of marketable permits automatically accommodates itself to growth and inflation. Since
there can be no change in the aggregate quantity of emissions without some explicit action on
the part of the agency, increased demand will simply translate itself into a higher market-clearing
price for permits, with no effects on levels of pollution. On the other hand, polluters are likely
to prefer the permit approach because it can involve lower levels of compliance costs. Besides
practical differences, the symmetry between price and quantity approaches is critically dependent
upon the assumption of perfect knowledge. In a setting of imperfect information concerning cost
functions and the marginal benefit that can potentially be achieved, the outcomes under the two
approaches can differ in important ways, as described in the next paragraph.
Price vs. Quantity In a seminal paper, ? investigated the asymmetry between price and
quantity instruments and produced a theorem with extremely important policy implications.
The theorem establishes the conditions under which the expected welfare gain under a unit tax
either exceeds, is equal to, or falls short of that under a system of marketable permits (quotas).
In short, the theorem states that in the presence of uncertainty concerning the costs of pollution
control, the preferred policy instrument depends on the relative steepness of the marginal benefit
and cost curves. Weitzman’s intuition is straightforward. Consider, for example, the case where
the marginal benefits curve is quite steep but marginal control costs are fairly constant over the
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relevant range. This could reflect some kind of environmental threshold effect where, if pollutant
concentrations rise only slightly over some range, dire environmental consequences follow. In such
a setting, it is clearly important that the environmental authority has a close control over the
quantity of emissions. If, instead, a price instrument were employed and the authority were to
underestimate the true costs of pollution control, emissions might exceed the critical range with a
resulting environmental disaster. In such a case, the Weitzman theorem tells us that the regulator
should choose the quantity instrument because the marginal benefits curve has a steeper absolute
slope than the marginal cost curve. Suppose, next, that it is the marginal abatement cost curve
that is steep and that the marginal benefits from pollution control are relatively constant over
time. The danger here is that because of imperfect information, the regulatory agency might, for
example, select an overly stringent standard, thereby imposing excessive costs on polluters and
society. Under these circumstances, the expected welfare gain is larger under the price instrument.
Polluters will not get stuck with inordinately high control costs, since they always have the option
of paying the unit tax on emissions rather than reducing their pollution further. It may be helpful
to explain this argument with an illustration. In figure ?? we depict two marginal benefit curves
MB ranging from horizontal MBI to vertical MBII . E is the point where the expected marginal
cost curve MCE crosses the marginal benefit curves. Based on the expected marginal cost curve,
the regulator will select a tax level T under a price system, or, alternatively, a number of permits
qp under a quantity system. If MCR turns out to be the actual marginal cost curve, the price
approach will result in emission reduction of qt. In the situation of a horizontal marginal benefit
curve MBI , the price instrument achieves the true optimal outcome qt. The quantity instrument,
instead, produces a distortion equal to (qp − qt). The opposite is true in the other extreme case
MBII : the permit approach produces the optimal outcome and the tax approach results in a
distortion equal to (qt − qp). An identical argument shows in a similar fashion that this relation-
ship holds when the realized marginal cost curve MCR lies above the expected marginal cost curve.
The Weitzman theorem thus suggests the conditions under which each of these two policy in-
struments is to be preferred to the other in the presence of abatement cost uncertainty. Not
surprisingly, an expected outcome even more favourable can be obtained by using price and
quantity instruments in tandem, see ?. After two decades, ? showed that benefit uncertainty
also matters. In particular, the instrument-neutrality long identified with equal absolute valued
slopes of marginal benefits and marginal costs likewise disappears when there exists a signifi-
cant correlation between them. Quite remarkably, Stavins’ results suggest that the conventional
identification - under Weitzman policy instrument recommendations - of a price (tax) instrument
can in fact be reversed, to favor instead a quantity (marketable permits) measure. On the other
hand, his results also suggest that it is less likely that the conventional identification of a quantity
measure as being more efficient to a price measure will be reversed.
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Figure 3: Price system versus quantity system. MB stands for marginal benefit curve, and MC for
marginal cost.
Emission Trading Programs Largely for the reasons mentioned above, policy makers in the
U.S. have found marketable permits preferable to taxes and subsidies as a mechanism for providing
economic incentives for pollution control. The major program of this genre is the Emission
Trading Program for sulfur dioxide (SO2) organized by the American Environmental Protection
Agency. This market was created under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. It was
designed to address the acid rain problem by cutting back annual sulfur emissions by 10 million
tons. This market in principle grants relevant power plants to meet their emission reduction
quotas by whatever means they wished, including the purchase of extra emission reductions from
other sources, i.e. other firms. The scheme significantly increased the flexibility with which sources
can meet their pollution limitations. This has been important as it has allowed substantial cost
savings - see ? for further detailed descriptions. In the early stages the great majority of the
trades have been internal ones.2 A real and active market in emissions permits involving different
firms has recently begun to develop under the program.
Conversely, in the past, the use of taxes was more prevalent in Europe where they were
extensively employed in systems of water quality management - see ? for a complete summary.
However, taxes were typically low and have tended to apply to average or expected pollution
rather than to provide a clear cost signal at the margin. Moreover, the charges were overlaid
on an extensive command-and-control system3 of regulations that mute somewhat further their
effects as economic incentives. Recently, following the example of the Kyoto protocol, European
2This fact explains the large presence of zeros in the return time series of SO2. For an in deep econometric
analysis of the U.S. market for SO2 see ?.
3These are typically programs under which the environmental authority prescribes the treatment procedures
that are to be adopted by each source.
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policy makers implemented the largest and most important market for emission permits: the
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). At its launch in 2005, the scheme covered the
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from energy-intensive industry sectors in the then 25 member
states, responsible for nearly half of the EU’s CO2 emissions. Today, the scheme includes 27
countries and claims 80 per cent of the value of the worlds’s markets for marketable permits. The
scheme has so far worked as it was envisioned: a European-wide price on emission of CO2 was
established, businesses began incorporating this price into their decision-making, and the market
infrastructure for a multi-national trading program is now in place.
Since market-based instruments are extensively being used as a tool for pollution control at a
regional and international scale, there is an increasing need to develop effective dynamic models
for the price of marketable permits. In fact, a valid price model is an essential component for
any decision-making process, and for constructing optimal hedging and purchasing strategies
in a (GHG and carbon) constrained market. Furthermore, firms trade permits not exclusively
for compliance purposes but some take also speculative positions, as ? claim in their working
paper. Addressing the important aspect of effective models, the last section surveys the few
model attempts which exist in literature.
3 Factors which Affect the Performances of Marketable Permits
Systems
One of the first references to marketable permits can be found in the seminal works of ? and ?.
In these papers pollution-abatement problems are viewed within an economic, cost-benefit frame-
work in conjunction with the concept of property rights introduced in the previous section. Based
on such an idea, ? provides a rigorous theoretical justification of how marketable emission permits
lead to an efficient allocation of abatement costs across various “sources of pollution”. Necessary
and sufficient conditions for market equilibrium and efficiency are derived, given the setting of
multiple profit-maximizing firms who attempt to minimize total compliance costs. Literature
discussing those factors which can adversely affect the performance of marketable permit systems
- and which are not addressed directly in Montgomery (1972) - has been abundant. Among the
most important instances, concentration in the permit and output market have been exploited by
?, ?, and by ? respectively. The pre-existing regulatory environment has been discussed by ? and
the degree of monitoring and enforcement by ?. ? has considered the presence of non-negligible
transaction costs in the market. We briefly overview these and other papers below.
Marketable Permits and Market Manipulation The appeal of using marketable permits
as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market
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for permits will approximate to the competitive ideal. When the competition is not a foregone
conclusion, the question arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advan-
tage. ? has discussed such issues as market manipulation developing a one-period model where
one firm has market power and all transactions of emission permits take place at a single price.
The author’s principal finding is that the degree of inefficiency observed in the market is system-
atically related to the distribution of permits. In other words, in the presence of market power,
the initial distribution of permits matters - with regard not only to equity considerations but also
to cost.4 That is to say, it is the demand of the firm with market power which determines the
equilibrium price of emission permits. Building on the theory of cost-minimizing manipulation
and the literature on raising rivals’ costs, ? have discussed a different form of market manipula-
tion: exclusionary manipulation. Because permit prices are sensitive to the purchases (or sales)
of the firm with market power, exclusionary manipulation can aggravate the inefficiencies which
occur in both the market for permits and the product market.5 Similarly, the efficiency of mar-
ketable permit systems depends on the competitiveness of the output markets in which polluting
firms compete. ? has shown that the introduction of marketable permits increases aggregate
“welfare”if output markets are competitive. In contrast, in the presence of non-competitive out-
put markets, a system of emission permits may reduce social “welfare”even if the market for the
emission permits is perfectly competitive.
Marketable Permits and Preexisting Regulatory Environments The strength and ef-
fectiveness of the incentives created by a cap-and-trade scheme will depend in large part on the
rules that regulators apply to marketable permits schemes. These rules will determine how af-
fected firms will be compensated for investments in emission permits and whether ratepayers and
shareholders will share in the benefits of trading emission permits. The influence of uncertainty
regarding the regulation policy of public utility commissions in the U.S. market for SO2 have
been discussed by ?. The authors develop and analyze a model of individual utility decisions
that focuses on the choice between purchasing permits or investing in SO2 abatement measures
to comply with the law. Their key finding is that policy rules influence the relative cost of in-
vestments in emission permits versus switching to low sulfur fuels (a medium-term abatement
measure) or investments in emission control equipment (typically long-term abatement measures).
Furthermore, the authors show that such rules may distort the incentives for utilities to adopt
the least-cost combination of emission permits and other compliance strategies required to satisfy
U.S. regulations.
4Traditional models of marketable permits view problems of initial permit distribution as being strictly an
equity issue. The analysis of ? provides an example where all firms are assumed to be price takers. For the case
of one pollutant, the author finds that the distribution of permits will have no effect on achieving the target in a
cost-effective manner.
5Anticipating the discussion in the next section, in ? the dynamics of the permit price results from the interac-
tions of buyers and sellers orders in the permit market.
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Marketable Permits and Enforcement Degrees The degree of monitoring and enforcement
has also been the subject of several studies. ?, for instance, extends the previous research on
marketable permits in the presence of noncompliant firms. The author makes a specific compari-
son between command-and-control and marketable permits systems when regulatory authorities
are unable to achieve full compliance. In particular, Keeler studies the sensitivity of the shape
of the penalty function faced by non-compliant firms. His analysis indicates that under plausible
penalty functions, marketable permits may allow more pollution or higher fraction of regulated
non-compliant firms. These results highlight that the success of pollution control strategies reliant
on marketable permits deeply depends on implementation schemes.
Marketable Permits and Transaction Costs Since ?, the presence of transaction costs in
the U.S. markets for SO2 permits has been regarded as a fact. Though ? and ?, among several
other authors, had already commented on the potential importance of transaction costs in the
markets for emission permits, ? was the first who formally includes transaction costs into an
analytic model. Another source of indirect evidence of the prevalence of transaction costs in the
U.S. market for SO2 permits comes from the well-documented “internal trading”, as opposed to
“external trading” among firms.6 It has been hypothesized that the crucial difference favoring
internal trades and discouraging external ones is the existence of significant transaction costs that
arise when trades are between one firm and another -see ?. Stavins claims that transaction costs
reduce the volume of permits trading, regardless of the specific form the marginal control-cost
and transaction-cost functions take. This holds insured the marginal control cost functions are
nondecreasing. A formal proof of this statement is found in ?. Not surprisingly, equilibrium
permit allocations are sensitive to initial distributions of permits. This result is fully consistent
with the Coase Theorem, ?, which states that in the presence of transaction costs, the anticipated
outcome from a process of bilateral negotiation is variant with respect to the initial assignment
of property rights. In sum, the presence of transaction costs reduce trading levels and lower the
discretion of each environmental agency which, as opposed to ?, “can[not] distribute licenses as
it pleases.”
The attempt to find a specific initial permit allocation to overcome some of the problems described
so far, can actually result in a scheme that will be far more costly than planned. This may
argue for the economist’s favorite permit-allocation mechanism: Auctions. This approach, for
instance, becomes even more attractive in the presence of transaction costs. ? have analyzed
the distributional implications of allocating CO2 emission permits through auctions rather than
through some form of grandfathering.7 The authors argue that auctioning is superior because
6Again, this fact justifies the large presence of zeros in the return time series of the SO2, as mentioned in a
previous footnote.
7For a detailed discussion of initial allocation criteria see ? and references therein. For a comprehensive analysis
10
it increases efficiency by reducing existing tax distortions; it also offers greater incentives for
innovation and gives more flexibility in the distribution of costs; finally, it reduces the need for
politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents. On this latter issue, ? considers a
construction of an allocation scheme in the presence of market power. Prior to this, ?? conducted
an experimental analysis on auction and rules design. However, as also pointed out by some of
the previous authors, auctions may not necessarily be chosen - and in fact are scantly employed
- due to vested interests introducing a powerful voice in favor of grandfathering.
4 Modeling Marketable Permits
Literature which focuses on the mechanism-design and on economic and policy implications of
marketable permits is extensive, as is clear from previous sections. However, an explicit and
formal study of the price dynamics of emission permits is an almost-unexplored area. Most of
the present research relies on Montgomery’s key findings: in a competitive market with perfect
information, the equilibrium price of the emission permits is equal to the marginal costs of the
cheapest pollution abatement measure. This statement underpins the belief that a high price level
for emission permits brings about the relevant companies with lower marginal abatement costs in
order to exploit consequent price differences. Such companies make profits by lowering the level
of pollution more than is necessary, in order to comply with regulations and subsequently sell
their unused permits and relying on banking opportunities.8
The Permit Market under Certainty Instead of limiting inter-temporal trading to banking,
? allows both borrowing and banking and extends the work of ? and ? providing a more
general treatment of permit trading in continuous time by means of optimal-control theory. In
particular, the author explores the problem of minimizing the inter-temporal cost (C(et)) of
reducing pollution by modeling a general firm in the presence of emission permits that are tradable
across firms and through time (xt, t ∈ [0, T ]). In such a setting, firm i-th (i = 1, . . . ,I) may
directly abate emissions (ei,t), and it may purchase (xi,t > 0), sell (xi,t < 0), bank (Bi,t ≥ 0)
or borrow (Bi,t < 0) emission permits in order to meet regulations or take advantage of any
opportunity that may arise. Rubin evaluates individual firms that optimally control abatement
costs and permit purchases and sales, given a risk-free rate of interest (r), an initial endowment
of the social and economic impact of allocation criteria see ? and ?.
8To generate permits, a firm may choose to pollute less than the current permitted level and sell the “un-
used”permits to a different firm or deposit them in an “emission bank account”to be used later by the firm or
sold at a later time to another firm. The borrowing of permits occurs when a firm pollutes more than its current
permitted level, but the cumulative deficit must be repaid by the end of the scheme.
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of permits (Ni) and an exogenous permit price (St)
min
xi,ei,t
∫ T
0
e−rt [Ci (ei,t) + St · xi,t] dt (1)
s.t. Bi,t = Ni −
∫ t
0
(ei,s − xi,s) ds; Bi,0 = 0; ei,t ≥ 0.
Necessary conditions for optimization imply that each firm purchases or sells xi permits until the
discounted marginal cost of a permit in its bank account equals the discounted price of a permit.
Solving the minimization problem, Rubin shows that each firm equates marginal costs of pollu-
tion abatement with the price of an emission permit, i.e. −∂Ci (ei,t) /∂ei,t = St. In particular,
the marginal cost is shown to be constant in time when each firm can bank and borrow permits.
Conversely, if the firm desires to borrow but this is not permitted, the marginal cost decreases
in time. A special case arises when the discount rate is nil. In this situation firms will have
no incentive to undertake abatement measures until a future date. If pollution emission rates
becomes more strict through time, firms tend to save more or buy more permits in the beginning
for later use. Conversely, higher discount rates lower the value of future cost savings and decrease
the incentive for firms to bank permits. One of the most important findings of this paper is the
identification of the ability of firms to shift their emission stream through time as a consequence
of banking and borrowing. In particular, when social damages are an increasing function of the
level of pollution emitted at any one time and pollution standards become stricter through time,
banking is a positive option. It provides cost saving to firms by allowing them to adjust their
own internal rates of emission reduction to pollution standards set externally by regulations.
However, when regulations impose constant or easing pollution standards, then allowing firms to
borrow raises social damages while lowering the firms’ costs. Though ? provides a comprehensive
treatment of inter-temporal emission trading, its analysis has been framed in a world of certainty
where the permit price is assumed to be exogenous.
? attempts to overcome the first limitation. The author takes explicitly into account the non-
negativity constraint on banking, i.e. (Bt ≥ 0). In fact, programs like Title IV do not allow
emission permits to be borrowed from future allocations. Schennach explores the consequences
of this constraint on the paths of the emission permits price and of the SO2 emissions in the
U.S. market.9 The author models all U.S. utilities (energy companies) as a single central planner
who faces an infinite-horizon optimization problem. The aim of the paper is to solve the inter-
temporal optimization problem faced by the central planner who is subject to electricity demand
constraints (ǫt)
10 and has to decide how much SO2 to reduce (at), considering the future costs of
9Readers interested in the effects of banking opportunities on social welfare are referred to ? and references
therein.
10ǫt is the SO2 emission that would be needed to satisfy the demand for electricity at time t without any SO2
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abatement (C(at)).
min
et
∫ ∞
0
e−rtC (at) dt where at = ǫt − et (2)
s.t. Bt = N −
∫ t
0
esds; et ≥ 0; B0 = 0; Bt ≥ 0.
As in ? in the ideal world of certainty, discounted marginal abatement costs equal the marginal
cost of an additional unit of banked emission. However, under borrowing constraints, Schennach
shows that the evolution of the central planner’s behavior over time can be divided into two
periods. The first is the banking period where the price of the emission permits increases at the
discounting rate (St = e
rt · C
′
(a0)). This is followed by a period where banking stops and the
price of the emission permits follows changes in both the marginal cost of abatement and changes
in electricity demand (St = ∂C (at) /∂at). The determination of the path of permits price and
pollution emissions is not analytically tractable unless a functional form for both marginal cost
function and growth in electricity demand are postulated. Nevertheless, Schennach’s findings
make it possible for the first time to describe the impact of important factors, such as the avail-
ability of low-sulfur coal and the growth in demand for electricity, on the SO2 permit market.
Similarly to ?, Schennach recognizes the importance of banking options to smooth out the in-
terjection of possible jumps in the marginal cost function of pollution abatement. Finally, and
more appealingly, introducing uncertainty in the marginal cost of abatement (C(at)) and in the
demand for electricity (ǫt), ? provides one of the first attempts to study the emission permit
price in a stochastic, continuous-time and infinite-time horizon model. The optimization problem
in the presence of uncertainty becomes
min
et
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtC (ǫt − et) dt
]
(3)
s.t. Bt = N −
∫ t
0
esds; et ≥ 0; B0 = 0; Bt ≥ 0.
where the discount rate ρ is constant and Et[·] stands for the conditional expectation E[·|Ft].
Though Schennach does not provide an exact analytic solution for (??), she conjectures that
the actual path of price and emissions may be quite different from their expected path. When
new information becomes available, the optimization problem has to be re-evaluated, possibly
generating cusp or discontinuity in the path of emissions and of price. This is precisely the
approach developed in ?.
The Permit Market under Uncertainty The results of ? reveal that, when allowed to trade
with one another, firms will collectively behave like a central planner who efficiently allocates
emission permits to each firm to minimize total costs. This allows ? - and previously ? - to
abatement requirements.
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simplify the analysis and model all firms as a representative agent who coincides with the central
planner. In ? the representative agent decides whether or not to spend money on lowering
emission levels. The model is based on the optimal abatement decision (ut)
11 of the risk-neutral
representative agent who has no opportunity, however, to trade permits. The agent continuously
emits offending gas (Qt) over the whole regulated period [0, T ] and its pollution dynamics evolve
according to an arithmetic Brownian motion dQt = µdt+ σdWt.
min
ut
E0
[∫ T
0
e−rtC (t, ut) dt+ e
−rTS(T, δT )
]
(4)
where
C (t, ut) = −1/2 · c · u
2
t
describes the abatement costs per unit of time;
S(T,QT ) = min (0, P · (N − δT ))
describes the potential penalty (P ) costs at the end of the trading period T ; and
δT = −
∫ t
0
usds+ Et
[∫ T
0
Qsdt
]
is the difference between the pollution abatement and the total expected emissions over the period
[0, T ], i.e. the net amount of emissions. By means of stochastic optimal control, the authors derive
a partial differential equation which describes the spot price dynamics of the emission permits.
The partial differential equation can be solved analytically only when r = 0 and the pollution
dynamics follow a white noise process, i.e. dQt = σdWt. This is a very special and restricted case,
and numerical techniques are required for more general pollution dynamics. Unfortunately, there
is no clear interpretation of the analytic solution. Nevertheless, the authors study how significant
factors affect the spot price of the emission permits. In particular, they show that the price rises
with increasing penalty costs (P ), expected pollution emissions (δt), and abatement costs (c); It
falls with lower initial allocation of permits (N). Quite remarkably, the emission spot price at
each instant t ∈ [0, T ] is bounded from above by the discounted penalty costs (e−r(T−t) ·P ) which
may occur if the agent does not achieve compliance by the end of the regulated period.
With a precise focus on the European emission market and a distinction between long-term and
short-term abatement measures, ? concentrate on the energy sector considering I affected utilities
which decide their abatement levels (ξit, i = 1, . . . ,I) at time t ∈ [0, T ] by relying on the cheapest
11ut denotes the rate of abatement which is chosen by the representative agent.
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possible abatement option in the short-term, i.e. the so-called fuel-switching (ζit).
12 Utilities can
also trade emission permits (xit). In particular, the authors characterize the evolution of the
permit price (St) with respect to the developments of fuel prices (gas and coal) and demand of
permits (Γi). Fehr and Hinz show that the equilibrium price of the emission permits is connected
to the solution of a global control problem and is a function of the total demand for permits
(Γ =
∑I
i=1 Γ
i) and of the aggregated pollution reduction
(
Π =
∑I
i=1
∑T−1
t=0 ξ
i
t
)
. The aggregation
of the control variables - demand (Γ) and trading (
∑I
i=1 x
i
t = 0) of permits, and emissions
reduction (Π) - makes the optimal solution of the global optimization problem equal to the
optimal solution of a social planner, and most importantly eliminates the dependency of the
permit price on the amount of permits traded at each instant. Therefore, the equilibrium price
of the emission permits is given in terms of the permit demand and the optimal switching policy
(ξ∗):
St = P · Et
[
1(Γ−Π(ξ∗)≥0)
]
(5)
In the numerical section, Fehr and Hinz analyze the dependence of the permit price on the cumu-
lated “relative”demand for permits (RDt) and on the actual fuel-switching price (ζ¯t).
13 Although
the permit price increases in both values, it changes significantly even with moderate variations
of the cumulative “relative”demand. In contrast, the impact of the fuel-switching cost ζ¯t on
the permit price is almost undetectable. Despite the loose relationship between emission permit
price and fuel price changes, the authors claim that fuel-switching remains a fundamental factor.
Finally, they investigate the important dependency of compliance probability and the price of
emission permits on the penalty level and on the expected total demand for permits at the incep-
tion of the period. The authors show that, for a given “relative”aggregated demand of permits
above a particular level, a rise in the penalty has on the one hand a strong and positive impact on
compliance probability and, on the other hand, it does not increase the price of emission permits.
It is worth noticing that, similarly to ?, the penalty P is still the upper limit of the permit price,
i.e. St ∈ [0, P ].
All papers surveyed so far provide a fairly comprehensive treatment of the inter-temporal evolu-
tion of the permit price. However, such studies have been framed in a setting where fundamental
aspects of trading permits, the strategic interaction among players, and the presence of asym-
metric information in the market for permits were not taken into consideration. ? confirms that
the market for permits does more than simply transfer permits from companies with a surplus in
12Fuel-switching involves the replacement of high–carbon (sulfur) fuels with low–carbon (sulfur) alternatives.
The most common form of fuel switching in the U.S. is the replacement of high–sulfur coal with low–sulfur coal.
In Europe, coal is typically replaced by natural gas. Therefore, ζit indicates the fuel-switching price process.
13The cumulated “relative”demand at time t is RDt =
“
Γt −
P
I
i=1
Pt
t=0
ξit
”
/λ ·(T − t). This corresponds to the
ratio between the net aggregated permits demand (aggregated permits demand minus the total pollution reduction
up to time t) and the total minimum amount of emission reduction (λ) achievable by the end of the period T .
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permits to companies with a deficit. This implies that emission permits are not only considered
a compliance tool, but are also traded as “financial”contracts. More generally, fully transferable
emission permits are not exclusively exchanged among relevant companies. For instance, indi-
viduals who may wish to retire permits, thereby denying their use to legitimize emissions, can
participate in the market. Such opportunities underline the importance of understanding the
aims of different market players, such as environmental groups, private citizens or pure specula-
tors. ? is a first attempt in studying such an issue. However, the rest of the literature identifies
investment and production-decisions of relevant companies as key drivers of the price formation
of emission permits. ? belong to this group. That paper is similar in spirit to ? and ?. Unlike
those two, ? develop an equilibrium model for the price dynamics of emission permits in the
short term that accounts for strategic interactions in the market for permits in the presence of
asymmetric information. In particular, the equilibrium price obtained for CO2 emissions reflects
the scarcity or excess of permits in the market. The authors consider I firms who continuously
emit offending gas (Qt) according to a stochastic exogenous process over the period [0, T ]. In
particular Qt evolves accordingly to a geometric Brownian motion
dQt/Qt = µdt+ σdWt.
Each firm i-th optimizes its cost functions at each instant t ∈ [0, T − 1] adjusting the allocations
of permits in their portfolios
(
δi,t = Ni +
∑t
s=0 xi,s
)
by choosing the optimal amount of permits
to purchase (xi,t > 0) or to sell (xi,t < 0). Chesney and Taschini prove that at each instant
t the equilibrium permit price (St) is a function of the penalty level (P ) and of the individual
expectations regarding not simply the aggregated, but the net accumulated pollution volumes of
company i-th
(∫ T
t
Qi,sds− δi,T−1
)
and of the other I− companies, where I− := I − i.
St = e
−ρ·(T−t)P ·
{
1− Et
[
1
δi,T−1>
R T
0
Qi,sds
]
· Et
[
1
δ
I−,T−1
>
R T
0
Q
I−,s
ds
]}
(6)
Equation (??) is similar to (??), though in this framework pollution abatement options are not
explicitly taken into account. In addition, the authors introduce asymmetric information imposing
a one-time lag-effect on every firm. This implies that each firm i-th has complete knowledge about
its own net accumulated pollution volume at time t
∫ t
0
Qi,sds− δi,t−1. (7)
However, it does not have complete knowledge about the net accumulated pollution volumes of
the others I− firms covered by the regulations.
∫ t−1
0
QI−,sds− δI−,t−1. (8)
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In sum, asymmetric information means that companies establish their permit trading strategies
based on different information sets.
Though an explicit form of the permit price dynamics is not provided, its numeric evaluation
has proven to be unproblematic. In the numerical section, the authors show that the equilibrium
permit price is sensitive to the different characterizations of the pollution processes
(
{µ,σ} ∈ RI
)
,
and to the strategic purchases and sales of all relevant companies. Not surprisingly, the higher the
expected pollution growths, the higher the probability of each firm being in shortage by the end
of the trading period. In consequence, the permit price will also be higher. Similarly, the higher
the uncertainty about each single net permit position before the compliance date, the higher the
uncertainty about each probability of shortage. In consequence, the permit price will also be
higher, again. The equilibrium permit price, in analogy with ? and ?, cannot be higher than the
penalty level though, i.e. St ∈ [0, P ]. Furthermore, in line with ?, ? and most recently ?, it is
evident that the initial allocation of permits
(
N ∈ RI
)
plays a key role in the price formation of
emission allowances. Finally, anticipating the importance of the development of derivative con-
tracts in the markets for emission permits, Chesney and Taschini address the question as how to
price CO2-linked contracts. The importance of such a market is two-fold. First, option contracts
satisfy the primary need of risk transfer from those who wish to reduce the risk of a permits
shortage situation - namely the risk of financial exposure - to those willing to accept it. Allowing
European companies covered by the EU ETS to reduce their exposure to emission price risk,
buyers and sellers can better plan their businesses. Furthermore, any project-based investment,
i.e. investments committed under the so-called CDM and JI mechanisms,14 and which at regular
intervals return CO2 emission reduction certificates yielding a payoff that depends on the CO2
permit market price, can be considered as a (real) option contract. It is natural to interpret
such projects as contracts whose value derives from the future CO2 permit price. Similarly, any
technological abatement investment or production process modification can be valued in terms
of costs saved by purchasing emission permits or revenue from the sales of extra unused permits.
In ? the authors address the question of pricing such option contracts.
Finally, we mention the paper of ?. Exploiting the arbitrage relationship existing in the EU
ETS at the end of the first phase between CO2 spot contracts and CO2 forward contracts,
the authors derive the dynamics of the spot price of the CO2 emission permits. The authors
14It is worth mentioning that a part from emission permits, relevant companies can also use “certificates” acquired
from outside the European Union, via the Joint Implementation (JI) or the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
to meet their obligations under the EU ETS. Also the Kyoto protocol allows the utilization of so-called flexible
mechanisms. Through JI, developed countries can receive emissions reduction units whenever they finance projects
that reduce net pollution emissions in other developed countries. Through CDM, developed countries may finance
GHG emission reduction or removal projects in developing countries, and receive credits for doing so. Interested
readers may refer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for relevant scientific, technical and
socio-economic information related to these flexible mechanisms.
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obtain such results by imposing an exogenous and arbitrary dynamics on the forward contracts.
Though such a relation holds only when banking opportunities are not permitted (a situation
which characterized in fact the transition time between the first and the second phase of the
EU ETS), the pricing analysis performed under incomplete information is a promising area of
research. It may stimulate further investigations and suggests new approaches for modeling the
price formation of CO2 emission permits in the present and future phases.
5 Conclusions
In contrast to the traditional command-and-control approach, marketable permits schemes accord
significantly more freedom to regulated firms: No specific technology is required, and uniform
emissions rate or percentage reduction is not imposed. Permits trading programs thus grant firms
with low-cost methods of abatement an incentive to over-comply and sell their remaining permits
to other firms which would otherwise have to face very costly pollution reductions. The result is a
large diffusion of these marketable permits systems among policy makers and a consequent need
to study the price formation of emission permits and to develop effective dynamic models for the
price process. We discuss the theoretical results in environmental economics which are behind
this popular policy measure and we then give an overview of the main factors that determine its
effectiveness. Since price models are an essential component for constructing optimal hedging and
purchasing strategies in a (GHG and carbon) constrained market, we analyze the recent papers
which develop static and dynamic price models, taking into account banking and borrowing
opportunities, pollution-abatement measures, strategic trading interactions and the presence of
asymmetric information in the market for permits.
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